Introduction
It is now time, in this concluding chapter, to address Whitehead's solution to the second question left open by Ward. This is the problem of how to conceive of God's agency in a world of spontaneous monads or actual occasions. More generally, it is the problem of providing an interpret ation of the God-world relationship that could account for their mutual immanence as well as their mutual transcendence. Whitehead's nat ural theology is also an attempt to understand how the general cosmo logical categories developed in the description of the natural world can be applied to the elucidation of some special aspects of our experience -namely 'those elements which may roughly be classed together as religious and moral intuitions'. 1 Whitehead's assumption is that we have, at least at times, a vague sense of higher, transcendent realities. Those who do not share this sensibility will regard Whitehead's theology as an idle speculation. They will see in his God the abstract God of the philosopher, a principle needed for the whole metaphysical apparatus to be set in motion rather than what Whitehead takes it to be: a God immediately present in our inner life.
The fact that God is for Whitehead a felt presence does not imply that there is anything dogmatic in his discussion of God's role in the world. In particular, Whitehead does not ally himself with any of the existing religious orthodoxies, nor does he try to found another one: 'The secularization of the concept of God's functions in the world', he writes, 'is at least as urgent a requisite of thought as is the secularization of other elements in experience.' 2 In the same way in which the theory of knowledge needs to be liberated from the sensationalist mythologythe Humean notion that all experience comes in the form of awareness of sense data -philosophical theology needs to be liberated by traditional ways of conceiving God and his ways of being operative in the world. Otherwise put, the problem is not that of defending any specific tradition, but of clarifying humankind's moral and religious experiences in the light of the general ontological commitments of the philosophy of organism.
This point is worth emphasizing, because the rise of a vigorous school of process-theology in the works of such authors as John Cobb and David Ray Griffin may give the impression that Whitehead was engaged in the same sort of enterprise, namely to defend Christian belief by providing it with a new metaphysical basis. This would be a misinterpretation of Whitehead's intentions; his sole aim was that of making sense of his own ways of experiencing reality. Whitehead's conception of religion is entirely individualistic: 'all collective emotions leave untouched the awful ultimate fact, which is the human being, consciously alone with itself, for its own sake.' As he also puts it, '[r] eligion is what the individual does with his solitariness '. 3 In spite of Whitehead's systematic ambitions, moreover, his speculations often look like tentative sketches rather than like definitive statements of a fully worked out theory. At times, there is even something rhapsodic in his way of dealing with a given topic. One might then be inclined to look at his works as if they were collections of genial aperçus, but it would perhaps be more accurate to say that Whitehead retains a cast of mind similar to that of the scientist. What he provides are often experimental attempts at dealing with a problem rather than definitive solutions. Be that as it may, nowhere does the incomplete character of Whitehead's thought come more clearly to the fore than in his natural theology. As he openly admits: 'There is nothing here in the nature of proof. There is merely the confrontation of the theoretic system with a certain rendering of the facts.' 4 God, creation, and the order of reality In order to understand Whitehead's theory of divine agency, some preliminary remarks concerning his denial of traditional ways of understanding the relation between God and the world are in order.
A first significant feature of Whitehead's God is that he is not the world's first cause. Whitehead does not address the question of whether the world has a beginning, but he simply assumes that it is infinitely extended with regard to both its past and its future. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argued that, if the universe has no beginning, then
